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Introduction
In our book, Company Financial Reporting: A Historical
and Comparative Study of the Dutch Regulatory Process
(North-Holland, 1992), we were critical of certain con-
ditions in which financial reporting was regulated and
practiced, and we proposed several reforms. The edito-
rial board of Maandblad voor Accountancy en
Bedrijfseconomie kindly invited us to review and discuss
the key points in the chapter containing our conclu-
sions and recommendations in the light of develop-
ments since the end of 1991, when we completed our
research and writing. This article constitutes our review
and was completed in July 2002. It should be under-
stood that this article is not an attempt to extend our
original research into the 1990s. To do so would have
required a far greater investment of effort in, for instance,
collecting opinions through interviews than was called
for by the article envisaged by the editor of this journal.
What we attempt to do in this article is to give our
interpretation of the salient facts as they presented
themselves to us at the time of writing. Given the limited
scope of this article, we obviously had to present our
arguments succinctly. We realize that, to those involved
in the complex policy-making underlying these events,
our review may occasionally appear unsubtle or wide of
the mark. In such cases, we hope that our review will be
read as an invitation to bring alternative views in the
open. This article is structured as follows. Sections 2
and 3 contain the core of the article, treating the stan-
dard-setting process and the mechanism of ensuring
compliance with standards, respectively. Section 4
reviews developments in the environment of financial
reporting, including the financial markets, the financial
press and academia. Section 5 follows up on two spe-
cific observations made in our book. We end in section
6 with conclusions.
Setting the Standards
A major development since 1991 is that the central focus
of standard-setting has irreversibly shifted from the
national to the international level. Because of this deve-
lopment, the Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving (RJ), like
other European standard setters, very likely finds itself in
the twilight of its tenure, except to the extent that it will
need to provide guidance to non-listed companies that
are not required by Dutch law to comply with
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)1. As
we will argue later, the RJ, as well as the Koninklijk
Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants (Royal
NIVRA), did not prepare themselves to play leadership
roles in the international standard-setting process.
2.1 Structure of the RJ 
The RJ is the body most responsible in the Nether-
lands for contributing to the improvement of finan-
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cial reporting practice, and it will presumably con-
tinue to be important for non-listed companies follo-
wing 20052. Its basic structure has not changed since
the early 1990s, i.e., three delegations of four mem-
bers each from preparers, auditors, and users, plus a
chairman. Eight of the twelve current members (there
is one vacancy) are RAs, compared to 12 out of 13 at
the end of 1991. Very recently, a representative of
NOvAA has been added to the auditors delegation,
and we understand that a representative of small and
medium-sized companies, presumably not an RA,
will fill the remaining vacancy in the preparers dele-
gation. Hence, the diminishing preponderance of RAs
on the board, although a crude measure by itself, does
suggest that a wider diversity of viewpoints is being
represented.
Historically, the auditors and users delegations played
constructive roles in the advancement of the work of
the RJ, while the preparers delegation was more of a
constraining force. Therefore, the composition of the
auditors and users delegations was critical to its suc-
cess. In our book (p. 377), we recommended that ‘At
least several genuine representatives of financial state-
ment users should form part of the [users] delega-
tion’. In 1991, only one of the four members of the
users delegation could be described as a user. At the
present time, the delegation is chaired by a partner of
a small audit firm (that has close links with the labor
movement, an important user), and its other three
members are two academics and a financial analyst.
It is still questionable whether the users delegation is
appropriately constituted, as the RJ has never had a
representative of either private or institutional inves-
tors. From 2005 onward, when the RJ will operate
mainly for the benefit of non-listed companies, the
role of a users delegation may not be as important as
it is now, although bankers will constitute an impor-
tant class of users. We will discuss the auditors dele-
gation in the section on the NIVRA.
In our book, we argued that the decision-making
process in the RJ was too slow (pp. 373-374). We have
noticed an acceleration in the RJ’s output process of
issuing guidelines since 1991 but mainly for the rea-
son that most of its time was devoted to adapting the
International Accounting Standards Committee’s
(IASC’s) standards to the Netherlands rather than
engaging in the more consequential work of develo-
ping original standards. It did, however, develop its
own ‘industry standards’ in such fields as insurance,
health care and housing cooperatives.
Obviously, these tasks would have claimed most if not
all of the RJ’s resources. But the important point is
that the RJ, as far as we can see, never outgrew the
consensus culture that was ingrained in its structure
from the outset. Therefore, as we envisaged in our
book (pp. 376, 383), even if the RJ had had resources
to spare we doubt that its decision-making process
would have allowed it to produce the kind of innova-
tive standards on emerging issues that would have
established the RJ as an important standard setter
internationally.
2.2 Role of the NIVRA
We also argued (pp. 380-381) that the NIVRA should
play more of a leadership role in the improvement of
accounting in the Netherlands. But the time for deve-
loping this role has probably passed, because, as we
stated earlier, international accounting standards have
overtaken national standards in importance. The
question then becomes whether the NIVRA is well-
positioned to play an international role. Unfor-
tunately, the NIVRA does not have the international
standing that it once had, at least in the realm of
financial reporting. As recently as the 1970s, the
NIVRA was still in its mode of aggressively advoca-
ting the use of current cost accounting, and in addi-
tion it participated actively in international accoun-
ting congresses, and, of course, as a founding member
of the IASC it formed one of the delegations to the
IASC’s board. The international influence of the
NIVRA was then at its zenith. Since then, the fervor
in the Netherlands for current cost accounting has
almost disappeared, and the NIVRA failed to find
another issue that would reestablish its international
comparative advantage. In 2000/01, when the IASC
board was restructured as the IASB, national seats
were abolished but to a certain extent replaced by
giving designated board members a liaison role with
eight national standard setters. Of the former board
member countries, only the Netherlands and Mexico
were not accorded a liaison. Nor did any members of
the new board come from the Netherlands or Mexico.
The Dutch are well represented on the Technical
Expert Group (TEG) of European Financial Repor-
ting Advisory Group (EFRAG). The chairman of the
TEG is Johan van Helleman, and one of the other ten
members, Hans Leeuwerik, is also a Dutchman.
Another Dutchman, Leo van der Tas, has been a
member of the IASC’s Standing Interpretations
Committee (now the IASB’s International Financial
Reporting Interpretations Committee) since its
inception in 1996. However, these positions are
occupied on a personal basis and therefore do not
necessarily represent a strong international position
of the NIVRA. We would argue that, in the present
n o v e m b e r  2 0 0 2 MAB 5 1 5
circumstances, the most convincing proof of the
NIVRA’s continued international standing would be a
liaison relationship between the Netherlands and the
restructured IASB. Formally, of course, the liaison
would be with the Dutch standard setter, the RJ. Yet
because the NIVRA is deeply involved in the work of
the RJ through its Commissie Jaarverslaggeving, the
existence of a liaison relationship would clearly reflect
the significance of the NIVRA itself. In fact, such a
liaison relationship has not been established3. We can
offer several reasons for this missed opportunity,
some largely beyond the NIVRA’s control, but others
within.
Prior to the mid 1980s, the Dutch accountancy pro-
fession was almost alone on the European continent
in focusing on the provision of financial information
to the capital market. The profession in virtually all of
the other countries on the continent fixated on repor-
ting to the income tax authority. Most of the major
companies in those countries were financed by bank
loans, or via family or state ownership, and the coun-
tries’ capital markets were less than vibrant. Accoun-
ting leaders in the United States and the United
Kingdom, as well as those in Canada and Australia
(all members of G4+14), believed that, of the accoun-
tancy bodies on the continent, the NIVRA would be
in the best position to understand the ideology and
practice of investor-oriented accounting. Leading
Dutch accounting practitioners were also well versed
in the U.S. and U.K. accounting literature. Thus, the
Dutch, being kindred spirits, were in demand as an
indispensable European partner in overseas standard-
setting circles. By the end of the 1990s, however, most
of the EU countries on the continent had philosophi-
cally signed on to investor-oriented accounting, and
the Dutch were no longer prized as the bridge
between the Anglo-American countries and most of
the countries of the European continent. During the
formation of the IASB, therefore, the Netherlands 
was passed over in favor of larger countries, such 
as France and Germany, as liaison partners. In this
sense, the Dutch became marginalized5.
In contrast, New Zealand, whose accountancy body
was not a permanent member of the IASC board, was
nonetheless added to the liaison list, after its standard
setter had already become a member of the G4+1
during the 1990s. This shows that a small country can
still play a role in international standard setting, and
we believe that appropriate or more timely action on
the part of the NIVRA might have done much to
place the Netherlands in a similar position.
The authors have learned from several sources that, in
1992, the RJ was informally approached by several
members of Anglo-American standard setters about
joining with them in a study group that eventually
became the G4+1. The informal response from the RJ
was that it did not then possess sufficient resources to
join in the work of the study group. Today, the budget
of the RJ, at about € 425,000, is approximately the
same as that of New Zealand’s Financial Reporting
Standards Board, at about NZ$ 865,000, or € 415,000.
At first sight, therefore, there is no reason to assume
that the RJ is insufficiently funded. Yet New Zealand’s
standard setter cooperates closely with the Australian
Accounting Standards Board, whose budget of A$ 3.1
million (€ 1.8 million) is significantly larger. Other
bodies participating in the G4+1 also had budgets far
exceeding that of the RJ6. Therefore, setting aside the
option of teaming up with another, better funded
standard setter, the NIVRA, as well as leading Dutch
accounting firms, would have had to provide the RJ
with more extensive resources for the RJ to have had a
chance to become an effective standard setter, whose
output would attract attention at the international
level. In fact, in the late 1990s the NIVRA did attempt
to make up some of the lost ground by participating
actively in the E5+2 study group7 and sponsoring its
discussion paper on ‘Management’s Analysis of the
Business’. However, E5+2 proved to be short-lived,
leaving the NIVRA to find other ways to regain its
international position. As it is, the Netherlands has
become an importer of accounting standards and is
no longer a major actor on the world stage.
Securing Compliance with Standards
3.1 General trends
In our book, we placed considerable importance on
the need for an effective organ to secure compliance
with financial reporting norms. We recommended
either an adaptation of the Financial Reporting
Review Panel in the United Kingdom, or an expan-
sion of the authority delegated to the Procureur
Generaal (pp. 378-379). The importance of com-
pliance has not diminished. The major unanswered
question in this regard is how EU countries, most of
which, like the Netherlands, do not have a history of
strong enforcement of accounting standards, will
enforce compliance with IFRS. Only the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia
have established effective programs for enforcing
compliance with accounting standards, although even
these programs may offer less than what is expected
by the capital market. In the Netherlands, the
Ondernemingskamer (OK), which was established in
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1971 as a judicial organ, was effective in the 1970s
and 1980s because of the intervention of Pieter
Lakeman and his SOBI in bringing lawsuits. But after
about 1987, except for several further interventions
by Lakeman in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the lack
of interest on his part meant the OK was no longer a
force in enforcing compliance. To be sure, compara-
tively little evidence has been adduced to suggest a
general problem with lack of compliance with Dutch
accounting law or the RJ’s guidelines. There have
been no financial scandals in the Netherlands in
which, as with Enron and WorldCom in the United
States, deceptive financial reporting has dominated
the headlines. Yet, in the case of Baan the quality of
financial reporting was nonetheless called into
question in the press. The NIVRA’s series of annual
surveys of financial reporting, Het Jaar Verslagen, lists
several examples of guidelines where full compliance
was not, or was only tardily, achieved. Moreover,
the flexibility and judgmental character of the law
and many guidelines makes it possible for doubts to
be aired about the quality of financial reporting even
though few formal breaches of the rules can be pointed
out. Given that the IASB’s standards promise to be
much more restrictive, we suspect that the number of
instances of alleged lack of compliance in the future
may well increase, unless a more rigorous system of
enforcing compliance becomes effective (see below).
It was only in 2000 that the NIVRA issued a new edi-
tion of the Richtlijnen Accountantscontrole in which it
finally got round to announcing that, for financial
statements to be regarded as in accordance with
‘accounting principles generally accepted in the
Netherlands’, they must comply with the bold-faced
passages in the guidelines. This is a step that the
NIVRA contemplated taking as long ago as 1983 but
postponed because of controversy in the profession
over the scope of its authority.
As will be brought out below, the Ministries of Justice,
Finance and Economic Affairs have announced their
intention to set up a financial reporting section for 
listed companies in the public sector Stichting
Toezicht Effectenverkeer, which was retitled Autoriteit
Financiële Markten in March 2002.
This very retitling of the Stichting as an Autoriteit is
indicative of a trend that we anticipated on pp. 381-
382 from the overleg-culture to a decision-culture.
The earlier consensus, or polder, culture in the
Netherlands, by which an elaborate and lengthy pro-
cess of consultation among all interested parties was
necessary before even the most carefully hedged deci-
sions might be taken, for example in fashioning the
accounting guidelines, has gradually evolved toward a
culture in which greater authority is vested in deci-
sion-making bodies to act without necessarily being
responsive to the advice received. Furthermore, the
STE was set up in the late 1980s to oversee the
Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel8, which was the
association of securities traders that governed the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. In this respect, the long
tradition of encouraging self-regulation in the
Netherlands has gradually been supplanted by regula-
tion by the public sector. A further example is the
imminent move by the Government to impose
external supervision on auditors, as a result of which
some of the responsibility for overseeing the legal
audit would be removed from the NIVRA. Both of
these developments – the movement toward a deci-
sion-culture and toward external regulation – are, in
our view, interrelated. In our book (pp. 378-383), we
argued that the former would be desirable and that
some form of strengthened regulation – although not
necessarily in the public sector – should be encouraged.
But the benefits of a decision culture might be lost if
it were to degenerate into a lobbying culture.
For its part, the Autoriteit Financiële Markten is
cooperating in the work of the Committee of
European Securities Regulators, which, among other
things, plans to stimulate the development and instal-
lation of effective compliance systems for financial
reporting in the EU Member States.
3.2 New System for the Netherlands
On 30 May 2002, the Justice, Finance and Economic
Affairs Ministries jointly informed Parliament of the
outline of their proposed structure for securing com-
pliance with IFRS in the Netherlands9. That all three
Ministries collaborated in the development of this
proposal meets one of the criticisms in our book,
namely, that there was a need for the policies of the
three Ministries – overseeing company financial
reporting, the capital market, and the accountancy
profession – to be co-ordinated ‘in the interests of
Dutch society’ (p. 378).
The report properly calls for the ‘passive’ supervision
by the OK to be supplemented by ‘active’ supervision
by an independent public body, the Autoriteit
Financiële Markten. The supervision would encompass
all of the external financial reporting (annual, half
yearly and quarterly reports) by companies domiciled
in the Netherlands with securities listed on EU stock
markets. The supervisor would be supported by an
annual budget of € 2.5 million for this purpose,
which implies the creation of a sizable staff of experts.
The supervisor would act on its own initiative and
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would possess the authority to require companies to
redress ‘material shortcomings’ via restatements or
supplementary information. The supervisor cannot
set new standards, but it may, in limited circumstan-
ces, issue its own interpretations of IFRS. Whenever
possible, however, it is expected to refer such issues to
IFRIC. Its freedom to act in this regard is further cir-
cumscribed by a requirement to act in concert with
other supervisory bodies in Europe. Whether this will
leave it any substantial powers of interpretation
remains to be seen.
We believe that this proposal represents an important
step toward regulating financial reporting compliance,
as it fulfills the recommendations we made in our
book on pp. 378-379. The proposed supervisory
structure appears to fall somewhere between that of
the Financial Reporting Review Panel in the United
Kingdom and that of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the United States10. The Review Panel
may act on referrals, not on its own initiative (which
is a weakness), and its initial action is to try to persuade
the company to restate its financial report in order to
give ‘a true and fair view’. Failing that, the Panel could
bring an action against the company in civil court
(which so far it has not done). The SEC not only has
authority to require companies to restate their finan-
cial reports, but it is also empowered to set accoun-
ting standards. Although it has historically looked to
the Financial Accounting Standards Board for stan-
dard setting, the SEC has, on numerous occasions,
modified U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) on its own initiative in order to
promote ‘full and fair disclosure’ and to prevent
financial reporting abuses.
One possible concern is that the report does not refer
to ‘getrouw beeld’, as set out in Dutch company law, as
the overriding arbiter of proper financial reporting
practice. The supervisor is to do no more than assure
itself that companies have adhered to ‘proper and 
consistent application of international reporting stan-
dards, and [that the financial statements are] compa-
tible with the rest of the contents of the annual report
to shareholders’11. Yet the fact that the aforementioned
EU regulation charges the European Commission to
accept only those IFRS ‘whose application results in a
true and fair view of the financial position and
performance of an enterprise’ (paragraph 9 in the
preamble), seems to imply that a Member Country’s
supervisor need not again address this issue. IFRS
itself provide for a ‘fair presentation’ override only in
‘the extremely rare circumstances when management
concludes that compliance with a requirement in a
Standard would be misleading’ (IAS 1).
Complementing this proposed new structure 
applicable to listed companies, there should be a sys-
tematic effort to secure compliance with the financial
reporting norms applicable to non-listed companies
that are not required to adopt IFRS. The NIVRA
should be prepared to play the central role in this
sphere. The system of peer reviews (collegiale toet-
sing) in use since 1997 does, among other things,
address this issue. However, the primary focus of peer
reviews is on the effectiveness of internal systems of
quality control, not on compliance with financial
reporting standards. The NIVRA also regularly 
surveys the quality of financial statements filed with
the Registrar of Companies (Handelsregister), but
this does not, apparently, lead to consultation with
the auditors involved on an individual basis.
Other issues
The shareholder culture has risen to greater promi-
nence in the last ten years. According to the Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek, the percentage of house-
holds that own company shares has risen from 8.9%
in 1993 to 17.2% in 1999. At the same time, there has
been a heightened interest in the quality of corporate
governance, as evidenced by the private-sector Peters
report, Corporate Governance in the Netherlands,
issued in 1997. Yet the insular character of company
supervisory boards, which are empowered to select
their own members, continues to constitute a barrier
to hostile takeovers. In our book, we raised the 
prospect of the eventual approval of the 13th Directive
on company takeovers. This event has yet to happen.
But even though the Directive was not approved in its
first submission to the European Parliament, it is on
course for resubmission following modifications.
Once the Directive is approved, thus lowering the bar-
riers to contested takeovers in the EU, it is likely that
companies will, as in the United States and United
Kingdom, come under increased pressure to report
favorably on earnings, which in turn will underscore
the importance of an alert and rigorous supervisor to
enforce compliance with accounting standards.
Since 1991, the financial press has taken a more active
interest in financial reporting, including especially
Het Financieele Dagblad. Both De Volkskrant and NRC
Handelsblad have expanded their business sections to
devote more coverage to financial reporting, perhaps
as a consequence of the steady rise in the stock mar-
ket in the 1990s. Furthermore, in some parts of the
financial press one sees more criticism of company
financial reporting than before. Also since 1991, there
has been a significant increase in the number of
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Dutch companies whose shares are publicly traded in
New York, and during the 1990s there has been an
increasing awareness among investors and in the
financial press of the reporting standards of U.S.
GAAP, which were, at least before Enron, regarded 
as more demanding. In March 2002, Philips,
whose shares had been traded in New York since
1953, announced the adoption of U.S. GAAP in its
primary financial statements, thus joining a number
of other prominent European companies (e.g.,
DaimlerChrysler, Siemens, Deutsche Bank).
In regard to Dutch accounting academe, we noted in
our book (p. 377) the lack of an independent voice
and a preoccupation with practical as opposed to
more fundamental research, and we linked both to
the preponderance of part-time academics. The num-
ber of full-time professors has indeed increased
somewhat, and the number of Dutch contributions
to international research journals has certainly
grown, albeit from a very low base. While these deve-
lopments are to be welcomed, there is still much to be
done to establish an international reputation for aca-
demic research emanating from the Netherlands.
At the same time, it is important that a heightened
focus on international research does not, as has
occurred in some other countries, diminish the inte-
rest of academics in the issues and problems 
in accounting policy and practice. Indeed, one sign 
of a loosening of ties between practice and academe
was the discontinuation in 2000 of the annual 
fma-Congres, the only event at which accounting 
academics and practitioners convened in order to give
and hear papers.
Another is the decision to dismantle the Limperg
Instituut, a research center sponsored by the accoun-
tancy profession and several universities that never
realized the high expectations set for it.
Two Observations
Two of the observations in our book resonate well
today. First, we raised the specter that European com-
panies would complain of ‘competitive disadvantage’
(p. 379) if the financial reporting requirements in one
country were more rigorous in their country than in
others. In fact, one only need read the letters posted
by the IASB on the subject of share-based payments
to see that some 16 major European multinationals,
including four from the Netherlands, have claimed
competitive disadvantage if the IASB were to require
the expensing of the value of employee stock options
without a corresponding change occurring in U.S.
GAAP. This claim has a basis in paragraph 15 in the
preamble to the aforementioned European Union
Regulation 1606/2002. In that paragraph, it was stated
that ‘the [European] Commission should take into
account the importance of avoiding competitive dis-
advantages for European companies operating in the
global marketplace’. Consequently, our perception
that competitive advantage may be ‘a pretext to resist
any new reporting requirements’ (p. 379), while per-
haps no longer an issue as between European coun-
tries, has nonetheless become a major issue in the set-
ting of international accounting standards to the
extent that (1) the Americans resist the adoption of
some of those standards or (2) the IASB is under
pressure to converge with U.S. GAAP.
Second, we wrote: ‘Especially at a time when, as in a
number of countries, the increasingly commercial
environment in audit firms threatens the auditor’s
steadfast dedication to principle in discussions with
clients, the organization of auditors must invigorate
the commitment to independence and integrity on
the part of the audit profession’ (p. 381). To be sure,
major accounting and auditing questions have been
raised in the press in in such notorious cases as
Lernout & Hauspie, Cendant, Sunbeam, Waste
Management, Enron, Comroad, Xerox and
WorldCom. While these cases did not occur in the
Netherlands, they nonetheless sounded an alarm to
auditors, accountancy bodies and financial market
regulators around the world. In June of this year,
the NIVRA issued further guidance on auditors’ inde-
pendence, based on a recent European Commission
statement of recommended principles. To its credit,
the NIVRA, in a joint effort with the NOvAA, was the
first national organization to act on the Commission’s
recommendations. Yet we would argue that this still
leaves the Netherlands as an importer rather than an
exporter of ideas. Moreover, by deferring its action
until the signal was given by the European
Commission, the NIVRA made itself vulnerable to
the charge of not taking decisive action while the
issue of independence was repeatedly, and critically,
raised in the Dutch press during the second half of
the 1990s.
Conclusion
We are pleased that several of the recommendations
in our book have become reality, although we do not
claim the credit. The three Ministries are co-ordina-
ting their mandates, a more effective system for
enforcing compliance with accounting norms has
been advanced by the Government, the RJ has accele-
rated its production of guidelines, and there is a more
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lively discussion of financial reporting in the press.
While the NIVRA played a role in some of these deve-
lopments, any leadership by it in this sphere has not
been evident to the public. In our book, we wrote,
‘the NIvRA should perform a clear and understanda-
ble function as a forceful intermediary between the
users and preparers of financial information. The role
must be visible to outsiders, else its effect could be
diluted’ (p. 381). Our impression is that the NIVRA
has been very implicit in its approach. The perfor-
mance of a country’s major accountancy body should
be more transparent.
While we are encouraged by recent steps taken
toward establishing an administrative authority for
enforcing compliance with IFRS in the Netherlands,
we are disappointed that the Netherlands is playing
less of a role in the work of the IASB than it did in
that of the IASC. While we realize that the scope for
the Netherlands’ role in international standard setting
is narrower than before, we believe that, with inspired
leadership, coupled with matching imagination and
resources, a more significant contribution by the
Dutch accounting profession and standard setter
could yet be achieved.
Recent developments have heightened the urgency of
a further point made in our book, namely, that ‘the
organization of auditors must invigorate the commit-
ment to independence and integrity on the part of
the audit profession’ (p. 381). The private sector
should demonstrate leadership in this field, and
promptly, else the Government will move even 
further than it has so far to fill the void. 
Noten
1 In 2001, the IASB changed International Accounting Standards to
International Financial Reporting Standards.
2 In July 2002, the European Union promulgated Regulation 1606/2002
requiring all listed companies to comply with IFRS by 2005 (or by 2007
for companies already listed in the United States and that already
applied US GAAP in ﬁnancial years starting before July 2002 ).
3 Board member Geoffry Whittington does function as a liaison with the
Netherlands and the Nordic countries, but this is intended as a ‘second
tier’ liaison, in contrast with his primary liaison with the UK Accounting
Standards Board.
4 The founding members of the G4+1, established in 1994, were the
standard setters in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and
Australia. New Zealand was added several years later. The ‘+1’ was the
IASC.
5 To be sure, both France and Germany were founding members of the
IASC, yet prior to the 1990s the accounting and ﬁnancial authorities in
France and Germany had taken few steps to encourage the use of the
IASC’s standards in their respective countries.
6 The U.K. Accounting Standards Board’s 2001 budget was £ 2.9 million
(€ 4.5 million), and the Canadian Accounting Standards Board had a
2001 budget of C$ 2.4 million (€ 1.5 million). 
7 The European Accounting Study Group (E5+2) was formed in 1997. Its
membership included the ﬁve European delegations to the IASC
Board, i.e., France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries
and the United Kingdom, joined by representatives of their national
standard-setters, the European Commission and FEE.
8 The Amsterdam Stock Exchange is now governed by Euronext, a for-
proﬁt, private sector body that also controls the Paris, Brussels and
Lisbon exchanges.
9 ‘Kabinetsstandput toezicht op externe ﬁnanciële verslaggeving beurs-
genoteerde ondernemingen’ (28 386 nr 1, 30 May 2002).
10 Until it becomes known precisely what powers of enforcement the
Autoriteit will possess, and what possibilities companies may have to
appeal against its decisions, the comparison with these two overseas
bodies remains somewhat unclear.
11 We presuppose that this requirement of compatibility would apply
also to half yearly and quarterly reports.
